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The New EC Merger Regulation: A
First Assessment of its Practical
Impact

Dr. Werner Berg, LL.M. *
In the late evening of November 27, 2003, the Council of Ministers
reached a political agreement on the amended text of the European
Community Merger Regulation' ("ECMR"), which is due to enter into force
on May 1, 2004, the date for enlargement of the European Union. The new
Council Regulation, (EC) No 139/2004 ("New ECMR"), the definitive
version that received formal Council approval on January 20, 2004,2 marks
the culmination of an ongoing reform procedure which was launched by the
E.U. Commission in December 2001 on the basis of a review clause in the
ECMR.3 The final text brings about significant amendments, which include
the introduction of the so-called "significant impediment of effective
competition" test ("SIEC test"), facilitation of the referral procedures, and
increased flexibility concerning the filing date and the commitment
procedures.
In the following article, the New ECMR will be assessed from a
practitioner's perspective. Since the new substantive test is being dealt with
in another contribution to this Symposium, 4 this analysis focuses on the
• Gleiss Lutz, Brussels.
Council Regulation 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the Control of Concentrations
Between Undertakings, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1, corrected version 1990 O.J. (L 257) 13
[hereinafter EC Merger Regulation], amended by Council Regulation 1310/97 of 30 June
1997, 1997 O.1. (L 180) 1, corrected version 1998 O.J. (L 40) 17 [hereinafter Council
Regulation 1310/97].
2 Council Regulation 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the Control of Concentrations
Between Undertakings, 2004 O.. (L 24) 1 [hereinafter New EC Merger Regulation]. Please
note that the New ECMR has been recast in the interest of clarity. Council Regulation (EC)
No 139/2004 is thus a consolidated version of the New ECMR.
3 See Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation 4064/89 of 11 December 2001,
COM
(2001)
745/6
final,
available
at
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/
sgadoc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber&lg=en&typedoc=COMfinal&andoc=2001
&nu doc=745 (last visited Mar. 4, 2004).
4 See Alexander Riesenkampff, The New E.C. Merger Control Test under Art. 2 of the
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jurisdictional and procedural issues. An introduction providing background
information on the context of the reform (Part I) is followed by a brief
description of the new substantive test (Part II). Analyses on the referral
system (Part III) and the new procedural provisions (Part IV) follow and
result in concluding remarks assessing the overall impact of the new merger
regulation (Part V).
I.

BACKGROUND

The current reform of the EC merger control system has to be viewed
in the context of several developments. First, as of May 1, 2004, the
European Union will encompass twenty-five Member States, thereby
extending the applicability of the ECMR to twenty-eight countries. 5
Second, the modernization of EC competition law, notably the application6
of the new regulation implementing Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty
from May 1, 2004, required adaptations of the ECMR. Third, the Court of
First Instance of the European Communities ("CFI") annulled four E.U.
Commission prohibition decisions in 2002, largely due to shortcomings of
proof in the E.U. Commission's assessments.
Finally, the divergent
decisions of the E.U. Commission and the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") in the GE/Honeywell concentration and the increased number of
referrals to and from the E.U. Commission 8 have also played a role in the
reform discussions.
The starting point for the second and-to use E.U. Commissioner
Monti's words-the "most far-reaching reform of European Merger
Control" 9 was the review of the jurisdictional threshold laid down in

Merger ControlRegulation, 24 Nw. J.INT'L L. & Bus. 713 (2004).
5 The current and the New ECMR also apply to the contracting parties of the Agreement

constituting the European Economic Area, which are not E.U. Member States, i.e. Iceland,
Liechtenstein and Norway.
6 Council Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the Implementation of the Rules
on Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1
[hereinafter Council Regulation 1/2003].
7 Case T-342/99, Airtours v. Commission, 2002 E.C.R. II 2585; Case T-310/01,
Schneider Electric v. Commission, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4071; Case T-80/02, Tetra Laval v.
Commission, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4381; Case T-251/00, Lagard6re and Canal+ v. Commission,
2002 E.C.R. 11-4825; see also Mark Clough, The Role of JudicialReview in Merger Control,
24 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 727 (2004).
8 Twenty-two of fifty-seven referrals under Article 9 ECMR occurred in the years 2002

and 2003, and three referrals under Article 22 ECMR occurred in the years 2002 and 2003
whereas there were none under Article 22 ECMR in the four preceding years.
9 Mario Monti, European Commissioner for Competition Policy, Merger Control in the
European Union: A Radical Reform, European Commission/IBA Conference on E.U.
Merger Control Brussels on 7 November 2002, availableat http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/

competition/speeches/indexspeechesbythe-commissioner.html
2004).

(last visited Mar. 4,

The New EC MergerRegulation

24:683 (2004)
Article 1(3) ECMR, the purpose of which was to avoid burdensome multijurisdictional filings within the European Economic Area ("EEA"). 10
Consequently, the Commission's Green Paper,11 triggering a public
consultation on the review of the ECMR, had a clear focus on the
jurisdictional issues, the development of which covered half of the Green
Paper. The substantive test, on the other hand, was only briefly mentioned,
presumably to trigger a discussion on the market dominance test rather than
to introduce a sustainable reform. The E.U. Commission's official reform
proposal, published in December 2002 ("Commission Proposal"), 12 did not
touch upon the substantive test at all. Discussions, however, took their
course and finally led to the adoption of a substantive test which is broader
than the mere market dominance test governing EC merger control to date
and presumably contributes towards convergence with the "Substantial
Lessening of Competition" test ("SLC Test") applied, for example, in the
United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom.
It should be noted from the outset that the reform of EC merger control3
consists of a number of different legal measures, of which the New ECMR1
is but one. In addition to this proposal, there are the Best Practices on the
conduct of EC merger control proceedings, 14 the guidelines for divestiture
commitments,15 as well as the guidelines on the assessment of horizontal
mergers. 16 Last but not least, there are several internal organizational
measures which have been or will be undertaken by DG Competition, such
as the appointment of a Chief Competition Economist 7 and a Consumer
10 The EEA consists of the fifteen E.U. Member States plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, and

Norway.
" See Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation 4064/89 of 11 December 2001,
supra note 3.
12 E.U. Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations
Between Undertakings, 2003 O.J. (C 20) 4 [hereinafter Commission Proposal on the Control
of Concentrations].
13 See New EC Merger Regulation, supra note 2.
14 DG Competition, Best Practices on the conduct of EC merger control proceedings, at
http://europa.eu.int/conmm/competition/mergers/legislation/regulation/best-practices.pdf (last
visited Mar. 4, 2004) [hereinafter Best Practices].
15 The Best Practice Guidelines for Divestiture Commitments consist of two model texts
for Divestiture Commitment and Trustee Mandate, as well as an explanatory note. Best
Practice Guidelines for Divestiture Commitments, IP/03/614 (May 2, 2003), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comi/competition/mergers/legislation/divestiture-commitments
(last
visited Mar. 4, 2004).
6 E.U. Commission Notice of January 28, 2004: Guidelines on the Assessment of
Horizontal Mergers under the Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between
Undertakings,
available
at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/c_031/
c_03120040205en00050018.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2004).
17 On July 16, 2003, the E.U. Commission appointed Professor Lars-Hendrik Rcller as
the Chief Competition Economist in its Directorate-General for Competition. At the time of
his appointment, Mr. R6ller was Professor of Economics at Humboldt University in Berlin,
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Liaison Officer 18 and the setting up of a panel to scrutinize the investigating
team's conclusions with a fresh pair of eyes. There are plans to draft
guidelines on "non-horizontal" (including vertical and conglomerate)
mergers in 2004 and the existing notices will be reviewed in the near
future.1 9
II.

THE NEW

SUBSTANTIVE TEST: "SIGNIFICANT IMPEDIMENT OF
EFFECTIVE COMPETITION"

To date, mergers that are likely to "create or
position as a result of which effective competition
impeded" are prohibited. The new test focuses on
rather than the structure of the market, and will

strengthen a dominant
would be significantly
effects on competition
prohibit mergers that

"significantly impede effective competition [SIEC]... .in particular as a
20
result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position.
The change to the new substantive test for assessing mergers was
fiercely disputed in the Council of Ministers until the last minute.
Agreement could only be reached after the delegations accepted a
compromise between the current dominance test and the SLC Test as
discussed in the Commission's Green Paper. 2 This compromise includes

Director of the Institute for "Competitiveness and Industrial Change" at the
Wissenschaftszentrum fir Sozialforschung, Berlin, and program director of the industrial
organization group of the London-based Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR). The
Chief Economist reports directly to the Director General of Competition and has a dedicated
staff of approximately ten specialized economists. His appointment is for a period of three
years, non-renewable, as decided by the Commission in December 2002 as part of the
Commission's merger control review package.
The role of the Chief Competition
Economist extends beyond mergers to include anti-trust and state aid control. He will have
three main tasks: guidance on economics and econometrics in the application of E.U.
competition rules, which may include contributing to the development of general policy
instruments; general guidance in individual competition cases from their early stages, and
detailed guidance in the most important competition cases involving complex economic
issues, in particular those requiring sophisticated quantitative analysis.
18 On December 9, 2003, the E.U. Commission announced the appointment of Juan
Riviere y Marti to the newly created function of Consumer Liaison Officer within the
Commission's Competition Directorate General. Mr. Riviere y Marti has worked in the E.U.
Commission's Competition Directorate General since 1989. He shall act as primary contact
point for consumer organizations, but also for individual consumers, alert consumer groups
to competition cases when their input might be useful, advise them on the way they can
provide input and express their views and maintain contacts with National Competition
Authorities regarding consumer protection matters.
19See Press Release, E.U. Commission, Commission welcomes agreement on new
Merger
Regulation,
IP/03/162 1,
(Nov.
27,
2003),
available
at
http://www.lex.unict.it/cde/documenti/vari/2003/031127commissione-en.pdf
(last visited
Mar. 4, 2004).
20 New EC Merger Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 2(3).
21 In its Green Paper on the review of Council Regulation 4064/89 the E.U. Commission
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an addition to Recital 25, which provides that the SIEC Test will "beyond
the concept of dominance, only [extend] to the anti-competitive effects of a
concentration resulting from the non-coordinated behavior of undertakings
which would not have a dominant position on the market concerned."
Furthermore, the Council of Ministers and the E.U. Commission made a
joint statement in which they agree that the notion of "significant
impediment to effective competition" should be interpreted in the light of
the objectives of the New ECMR and its Recitals, in particular the amended
Recital 25.
The SIEC Test will extend the scope of application to non-collusive
oligopolies which significantly impede effective competition. In these
cases the Commission will no longer have to prove lasting, tacit
coordination as required by the CFI in the Airtours case under the
dominance test.23 This will certainly bring E.U. merger control closer to the
jurisdictions relying on the SLC Test, such as the United States, Canada,
and Australia, facilitating alignment of the Commission's policy with those
of the U.S. Department of Justice and the FTC. It will, furthermore, require
the E.U. Commission to develop an exact definition of what "significant
impediment of effective competition" means in cases where a concentration
does not create or strengthen a dominant position. Under the dominance
test, the E.U. Commission did not have to elaborate on this criterion in
detail. Whether this will bring about significant developments remains to
be seen. Given the limits set for the new substantive test by Recitals 25 and
26 of the New ECMR,24 such developments may rather be triggered by the
new analytical framework (constituted by the notices for the assessment of
horizontal and non-horizontal mergers), and the procedural changes
(including organizational matters) rather than by the SIEC Test itself.

III. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES, NOTABLY THE NEW REFERRAL SYSTEM
The case allocation between the Member States and the E.U.
Commission was at the heart of the current reform of the EC merger control
system. The core target of the E.U. Commission's Green Paper2 5 that
triggered a public consultation on the review of the ECMR was the
establishment of automatic competence for the Commission once a filing
need for three Member States has been identified (the so-called "three-plus

referred to the SLC-Test as applied in the US, Canada and Australia. Green Paper on the
review of Council Regulation 4064/89 of 11 December 2001, supra note 3, at para. 160.
22New EC Merger Regulation, supra note 2, at Recital 25-6.
23See Airtours, supra note 7, at para 62.
24 See New EC Merger Regulation, supra note 2.
25See Green Paper on the review of Council Regulation 4064/89 of 11 December 2001,
supra note 3.
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system"). Due to harsh criticism from the legal community, 26 neither this
system nor the suggestion introduced in the Commission Proposal,27 namely
to tie the Commission's competence in with the referral of a case to the
E.U. Commission by either all competent or at least three Member States
(this could have been called "three-minus system"),28 made it into the final
text of the regulation. Instead, the reform is confined to amendments of the
referral system and a clarification of the concept of concentration under the
ECMR.
A. Post-Notification Referrals
Post-notification referrals have been an integral element of the EC
merger control system from the beginning. Article 9 ECMR contains the
so-called German clause, which allows referral from the E.U. Commission
to the Member States. This clause was introduced to meet Germany's
concerns about leaving the E.U. Commission with exclusive jurisdiction for
cases with a Community dimension. At the time, Germany had a longstanding merger control regime, which had proven its efficiency, whereas
merger control was only just being introduced at Community level. The
referral mechanism provided in Article 9 ECMR is intended to fine-tune the
effects of the turnover-based thresholds establishing jurisdiction as laid
down in Article 1 ECMR. Article 9 ECMR makes it possible to refer the
case (or parts of it) to the national merger control authority which is best
placed to deal with the concentration. It is thus possible to have a
concentration assessed at a national level, even if the thresholds for E.U.
merger control are met.
When the ECMR was adopted in 1989, it did not contain any
mechanism to allow joint referral from the Member States to the E.U.
Commission. Article 22(3) ECMR, which encompasses the so-called Dutch
clause, was introduced in the interests of Member States, such as the
Netherlands, which lacked their own system of merger control when the
26For the comments received by the Commission, see European Commission, Summary
of the Replies Received, at para. 9, at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/
reviewcomments/summary_publication.pdf (last visited Mar. 04, 2004) [hereinafter
Summary of the Replies received]; for single submissions by economists, associations,
national competition authorities, law firms, etc. received on the Green Paper, see European
Commission, Submissions Received on the Green Paper on the Review of the Council
Regulation (EEC) No. 4046/89, at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/
mergers/review/comments.html (last visited Mar. 04, 2004) [hereinafter Submissions
Received on the Green Paper].
27See Commission Proposal on the Control of Concentrations, supra note 12.
28 See Werner Berg & Andreas Digel, Zustandigkeit durch Verweisung: Ein Irrweg! Artikel 22 im FKVO- Vorschlag der Kommission [Competence through Referral: The Wrong
Track! - Article 22 in the Commission 's ECMR-Proposal],10 EUROPAISCHES WIRTSCHAFTSUND STEUERRECHT 445, 446 (2003).
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ECMR entered into force. Since January 1, 1998, the Netherlands has
established its own merger control system and within the EEA, even after
the accession, only the mini states Luxembourg 29 and Liechtenstein 30 do not
have a national merger control system. Article 22(3) ECMR was amended
in its first reform in 1998 to allow joint referrals 3' but was not used for joint
referrals until 2002. Joint referrals to the E.U. Commission have started in
recent years due to the consultation within the Network of European
Competition Authorities ("ECA")3 2. To date only three multi-jurisdictional
mergers notified to several E.U. Member States were jointly referred to the
E.U. Commission.3 3
1. Referralfrom the E. U. Commission to the Member States (Article 9
New ECMR)
In the past, Article 9 ECMR met criticism for a number of reasons;
notably the criteria for referring a case, the time schedule, and the problems
caused by partial referrals. Undertakings going through referral procedures
complained about cost increases.
Furthermore, there was also some
concern about the treatment of referred cases by national competition
authorities, mainly with regard to procedural aspects.34 Additionally, the
Article 9 procedure had been used infrequently. Until 2001, the year when
the E.U. Commission's Green Paper was published, only twenty-nine cases
had been referred from the E.U. Commission to the Member States. At the
end of 2003, the total number of referral decisions taken under this
provision was only fifty-eight.3 5
On only three occasions was
29 Luxembourg had approximately 430,000 inhabitants in 1999.
30 Liechtenstein had approximately 32,000 inhabitants in 1999.
31See Council Regulation 1310/97, supra note 1, at art. 1,para. 12(b).
32Established in April 2001, the ECA is a discussion forum consisting of the national
competition authorities of the EEA states, the E.U. Commission, and the European Free
Trade Association's (EFTA) surveillance authority. Its main goal is to improve the
cooperation between its member authorities. Since September 2001, the member authorities
notify one another of merger cases involving more than one jurisdiction. In April 2002,
these authorities adopted a set of uniform application principles, see Principles on the
Application, by National Competition Authorities within the ECA Network, of Article 22 of
the EC Merger Regulation, available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/eca.html (last
visited Mar. 4, 2004) [hereinafter Principles on Application].
33 See Case COMP/M.2698, Promatech/Sulzer (July 24, 2002), available at http://
europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2698_en.pdf;
Case
COMP/M.2738, GEES/Unison (Apr. 17, 2002), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2738_en.pdf, Case COMP/M.3136, GE/Agfa NDT
(May
13,
2003),
available at http://europa.eu.int/conun/competition/mergers/
cases/index/by_nrm_62.html; see also Principles on Application, supra note 32, at para. 5.
34 For a detailed description of the concerns, see Green Paper on the Review of Council
Regulation 4064/89 of 11 December 2001, supra note 3, at paras. 72-78.
35 It should be noted that this figure includes multiple counting of cases which are
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Article 9(2)(b) ECMR, a provision which had been adopted in the first
reform of the ECMR and entered into force on March 1, 1998,36 used as the
basis for a referral by the E.U. Commission to the Member States.37
Under the current version of the ECMR, the criteria for referring a case
constitutes a significant obstacle for referrals. Article 9(2)(a) gives the E.U.
Commission discretion as to whether and to what extent it would refer the
case to one or more Member States and requires that the concentration
threatens to create or strengthen a dominant position. The test under
Article 9(2)(b) is even narrower and is only fulfilled if the concentration
affects competition in a market which does not constitute a "substantial part
of the common market." It is the established practice of the Community
courts and the E.U. Commission to consider the territories of single38
Member States as constituting substantial parts of the common market.
Even regions within Member States have been regarded as constituting
substantial parts of the common market by the E.U. Commission. 39 To
date, satisfactory case allocation has also been constrained by the E.U.
Commission's lack of referral initiative and the lengthy procedures
involved.
Currently, referrals may only be undertaken after the
concentration has been notified. The Member States have three weeks from

partially referred to several National Competition Authorities; without such double-counting
the number would be fifty-five.
36See Council Regulation 1310/97, supra note 1, at arts. 1 & 3.
37 See Case COMP/M.2446, Govia/Connex South Central (Jul. 20, 2001), available at
http://europa.eu.int/conun/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2446_en.pdf; Case COMP/
M.2730, CONNEX/DNVBVG/JV (Apr. 24, 2002), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2730_de.pdf;
Case
COMP/M.2898,
Leroy
Merlin/Brico (Dec. 13, 2002) (of the three M.2898 Leroy Merlin/Brico referral decisions,
only the decision addressed to Portugal explicitly referred to Article 9(2)(b) ECMR),
availableat http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/ mergers/cases/decisions/m2898_pt.pdf.
38See, e.g., Case T-68/89, RTE v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. I1-485, at para. 64, affd
Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, PRTE and ITP v. Commission, 1995 E.C.R. 1-743
(Ireland, including Northern Ireland, constitutes substantial part of common market); but see
Case 77/77, BP v. Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 1513, 1537 (1978) (Advocate General Warner
questions whether Luxemburg constitutes substantial part of common market).
39 See, e.g., Case IV/M.417, VIAG/Bayernwerk, at para. 13 (May 5, 1994) (the Bavarian
market for power distribution), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/
mergers/cases/decisions/m47 de.pdf; Case IV/M.111, BP/Petromed (July 29, 2001),
(regarding the Spanish Canaries), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/
mergers/cases/decisions/mi 1 en.pdf. However, it should be noted that the "substantial part
of the Common Market" criterion was only accepted implicitly in the latter case and that, in
both cases, this had to be assessed under Articles 2(2) and (3) ECMR concerning the E.U.
Commission's jurisdiction. Had there been, at this time, a referral procedure as foreseen in
Article 9(2)(b) ECMR, the decision might have been different. For a detailed analysis of the
"substantial part of the Common Market" criterion, see AUGUST-CAREL MASKE, DIE
GEOGRAPHISCHE DIMENSION IM EUROPAISCHEN WETTBEWERBSRECHT [THE GEOGRAPHICAL

DIMENSION IN EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW] 241 (4th ed. 1998).
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notification to request referral, which has to be granted or refused within six
weeks from receipt of the notification. For the undertakings concerned this
meant significant delays in the procedure and potentially increased costs.
Consequently, the E.U. Commission replaced, in the Commission
Proposal, the market dominance criterion in Article 9(2)(a) ECMR with the
requirement that a concentration "significantly affects competition., 40 The
final text of Article 9(2)(a) New ECMR adopted by the Council of
Ministers adds-in line with the text to date-that it suffices to show that a
concentration "threatens to significantly affect competition on a market
within that Member State, which presents all the characteristics of a distinct
market., 4 1 Whereas the E.U. Commission's proposal to shorten the deadline
for the Member States for requesting a referral from three weeks to two
weeks 42 was overruled and remains at three weeks in line with the
procedure to date. Thus, the E.U.43Commission succeeded in claiming a
right for itself of initiating referrals.

Whether the replacement of the market dominance criterion in
Article 9(2)(a) ECMR with the requirement that a concentration
"significantly affects competition" constitutes an improvement for case
allocation remains to be seen. If this test were interpreted in line with the
SIEC test, any substantial increase of referrals under this provision would
be unlikely. Since the new criterion was introduced in order to facilitate
referrals, one may expect, however, an independent interpretation, which
would encompass-for example-coordination as explained in Article 2(4)
New ECMR. It will be interesting to see whether, in the long run, the SIEC
test in Article 2 New ECMR is influenced by the interpretation of the
substantive referral criterion in Article 9(2) New ECMR. In case the
concentration has been referred to the Member State(s), their competent
authority must decide upon the case without undue delay. It must inform
the parties to the concentration of the result of the preliminary competition
assessment and potential further action within forty-five working days after
the E.U. Commission's referral or, where a notification is requested, within
forty-five working days of receipt of a complete notification by the
competent authority.

See Commission Proposal on the Control of Concentrations, supra note 12 (emphasis
added).
41See New EC Merger Regulation, supra note 2 (emphasis added).
42 See Commission Proposal on the Control of Concentrations, supra note 12.
43See New EC Merger Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 9(2) (".... a Member State, on its
own initiative or upon the invitation of the Commission, may inform the Commission, which
shall inform the undertakings concerned...
44 id. at art. 9(6).
40
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2. Referralfrom the Member States to the E.U.Commission (Article 22
New ECMR)
The new Article 22 does not bring about any material changes to
Member States' ability to initiate a referral to the E.U. Commission.
However, the procedural rules will be streamlined. One or more Member
States may request the E.U. Commission to examine concentrations which
fall in their jurisdiction but "affect trade between Member States and
threaten to significantly affect competition within the territory of the
Member State or States making the request., 45 The E.U. Commission may
initiate a referral by inviting the relevant Member States to make such a
request. 46 The request must be made within fifteen working days of the
date on which the concentration was notified, or if no notification is
required, otherwise made known to the Member State concerned.47 Other
Member States will be able to join in a referral request within fifteen
working days of being informed of the request48 and the E.U. Commission
must decide, within ten working days thereafter, whether to take on the
case.4 9 The E.U. Commission must inform all Member States and the
parties to the concentration of its decision and may request the submission
of a notification.5 ° The Member State or States that made the request will
no longer apply their national legislation on competition to the
concentration, whereas Member States that have not joined in the referral
request will continue to apply their national merger regimes. The national
time limits relating to the concentration are suspended until it has been
decided where the concentration is to be examined.5 2
The procedural clarifications provided for by Article 22 ECMR are
clearly to be welcomed from the perspective of the parties to a
concentration. The clarifications facilitate anticipation of referrals and
streamline the procedure. Remaining uncertainties seem to be bearable. 3
Probably the biggest achievement, as compared to the concept foreseen in
the Commission Proposal, 54 is that the E.U. Commission will acquire

45 See New EC Merger Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 22(1).
46 Id. at art. 22(5).
47 Id. at art. 22(1).
48

Id. at art. 22(2).

49 Id. at art. 22(3).
50Id.

51New EC Merger Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 22(3).
512
Id. at art. 22(2).
53E.g., practice may develop an understanding of what is meant by "otherwise made
known to the Member State concerned." Id. at art. 22(1).
54 See Commission Proposal on the Control of Concentrations, supra note 12 (this is
fundamentally different from the two initial proposals under the three-plus and the threeminus system); see also Submissions received on the Green Paper, supra note 26 and
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jurisdiction over the case only insofar as it has actually been referred by the
respective Member State. Under the three-plus and the three-minus system,
the E.U. Commission would have acquired jurisdiction for the whole
European Union once a certain number of Member States had referred the
concentration to the E.U. Commission. 5
B. Pre-Notification Referrals
Probably the most important amendment in this area is the
implementation of pre-notification referrals in Article 4(4) (from the E.U.
Commission to the Member State(s)) and Article 4(5) (from the Member
State(s) to the E.U. Commission) of the New ECMR56. The introduction of
this kind of pre-notification referral fits in with the other amendments
according
to
which-contrary
to
the
current
Article
4(1)
ECM-concentrations will only have to be notified prior to their
implementation but the future notifications may also be made before the
conclusion of a final agreement (so-called "Intended Concentrations") 7
Pre-notification referrals can only be initiated by the parties to an Intended
Concentration. Once the new ECMR has entered into force, they may do so
by sending a reasoned submission to the E.U. Commission, which will
"transmit this submission to all Member States without delay."5' 8 The E.U.
Commission is currently developing a form reasoned submission
("form RS,") 59 which parties to Intended Concentrations will have to use to
initiate referrals.
1.

Referralfrom the E.U. Commission to the Member States (Article 4(4)
New ECMR)

In case of an intended referral to the Member States, the reasoned
submission needs to give reasons for referral. Referral is only possible if
"the concentration may significantly affect competition in a market within a
Member State which presents all the characteristics of a distinct market ' 6 °.

accompanying text; Berg and Digel, supra note 28 and accompanying text.
55See Submissions Received on the Green Paper, supra note 26 and accompanying text;
Berg and Digel, supra note 28 and accompanying text.
56 See New EC Merger Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 4(4-5).
57See id. at art. 4(1); see also infra Part I.A.1 for details on this part of the reform.
58See New EC Merger Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 4(4.2 & 4.5).
59The Draft Commission Regulation Implementing Council Regulation (EC) No
139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings ("EC Merger Implementing
Regulation") includes a draft form RS; for the public consultation of the EC Merger
Implementing Regulation. See Commission of the European Communities, The EC Merger
Implementing Regulation, available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/
mergers/legislation/regulation [hereinafter EC MergerImplementing Regulation].
60 See New EC Merger Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 4(4.1).
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Here again, it will be interesting to see how the E.U. Commission and the
national competition authorities interpret the term "significantly affect
competition." A distinct market is understood-in Article 9(2) ECMR-to
mean a territory where the conditions of competition are sufficiently
homogenous. 6 1 It is, however, unclear whether such a market has to be
entirely within62one Member State or may extend beyond the borders of one
Member State.
Member States referred to in the reasoned submission have fifteen
days to decide whether they agree to a referral. Agreement is assumed if
they do not respond within the deadline. If the Member State(s) agree(s) to
the referral and the substantive criteria are fulfilled, it is up to E.U.
Commission discretion whether or not to refer the Intended Concentration,
or parts thereof, to the national authorities. The E.U. Commission has to
decide within twenty-five working days from its receipt of the reasoned
submission. It must inform the other Member States and the parties to the
Intended Concentration of its decision. If the Commission misses the
deadline, "it shall be deemed to have adopted a decision to refer the case in
accordance with the submission made by the persons or undertakings
concerned., 63 If the case is referred to the Member States the parties do not
have to notify the case to the E.U. Commission, but must notify the national
merger control authorities if the national laws so provide.
Referral to the Member States at the parties' instigation is clearly to be
welcomed (as an option), but the practical use of this instrument is
questionable. Although the parties should not be required to demonstrate
that the effects of the concentration would be detrimental to competition,64
referral is only possible if "the concentration may significantly affect
competition in a market within a Member State. 65 This may in fact vitiate
the practical use of this referral provision.
2. Referralfrom the Member States to the E.U. Commission (Article 4(5)
New ECMR)
It is remarkable that no substantive criteria for referrals from the
Member States to the E.U. Commission are listed in Article 4(5) of the New
61 See EDURNE NAVARRO VARONA ET AL., MERGER CONTROL IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:
LAW, ECONOMICS AND PRACTICE at
62 See
Simon Hirsbrunner,

para. 14.23 (Oxford 2002).
Article 9,

in

KOMMENTAR

ZUM

EUROPAISCHEN

at para. 20
(Helmuth Schriter et al. eds., 2003).
63 New EC Merger Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 4(4), para. 4.
64 Recital 16 of the New ECMR explicitly provides that "the undertakings concerned
should not, however, be required to demonstrate that the effects of the concentration would
be detrimental to competition." Id. at Recital 16.
WETTBEWERBSRECHT

[COMMENTARY

ON

EUROPEAN

COMPETITION

LAW],

65Id. at art. 4(1); see also EC Merger Implementing Regulation,supra note 59, § 6.2.4.
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ECMR. This provision simply prescribes a sequence of information
transmissions, which is triggered by the parties to the Intended
Concentration with a reasoned submission to the E.U. Commission. The
reasons the submission has to provide will be specified in the final form FS.
A significant difference compared to the referrals under Article 4(5)
New ECMR is that it does not allow for partial referrals either in terms of
parts of the case or in terms of the referral being made by some (rather than
all) Member States. Member States have fifteen working days to decide
whether they agree to the referral and if only one Member State expresses
disagreement the case will not be referred at all.66 It is only if no Member
State has expressed its disagreement within the fifteen working day period
that "the concentration shall be deemed to have a Community dimension
and shall be notified to the Commission., 67 It should be noted that
initiating a referral under this provision may be very dangerous for the
parties to an Intended Concentration because the concentration, by
acquiring a Community dimension will be assessed by the E.U.
Commission with regard to its impact in the entire European Union
although it may have triggered filing needs only in a few Member StaLes.
Had it not been referred, it would have been assessed only with regard to
the territory of these Member States.68 If the Intended Concentration has
been referred to the E.U. Commission, the Member States may no longer
apply their national competition laws to the concentration.69
It seems doubtful that the new pre-notification referral system will
ever gain any major practical importance. The request for referral from the
E.U. Commission to the Member States is certainly not very attractive for
the parties to an Intended Concentration, given that they have to
demonstrate their concentration's negative impact on competition. The
absence of substantive criteria for the request for referral from the Member
States to the E.U. Commission may render this alternative more attractive
for the parties to an Intended Concentration. Given that the geographic area
of investigation may be significantly enlarged by an Intended Concentration
acquiring Community dimension, one will also have to wait and see what
practical use Article 4(5) New ECMR has. It is probably fair to say that
with the reform (and in the light of accession) the E.U. Commission's role
has again been reinforced. There will not only be more cases having a
Community dimension because of accession (and remaining turnover
thresholds) but also because referrals are more likely to the E.U.
66

67

New EC Merger Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 4(5), para.4.

Id. at art. 4(5), para. 5.

68See Berg and Digel, supra note 28, for the potential problems created under the

Commission Proposal, which had envisaged the creation of Community dimension to a
much larger extent and without prior right of initiative by the parties.
69 See New EC Merger Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 4(5), para. 5.
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Commission than from the E.U. Commission. Finally, one should not
forget that the E.U. Commission will be the primary addressee of the parties
in pre-notification referrals and the coordinator of the whole prenotification process.
C.

Clarification of the Concept of Concentration (Article 3(1) New
ECMR)

Finally, the Council of Ministers accepted clarification of the concept
of concentration in that it only applies to "changes of control on a lasting
basis" through mergers or acquisitions.70 This seems to have been the E.U.
Commission's understanding to date 7' but was not formally enshrined in the
ECMR.7 2
In addition, this clarification is also reflected in Recital 20 of the New
ECMR.7 3 This Recital explains that "transactions that are closely connected
in that they are linked by condition or take the form of a series of
transactions in securities taking place within a reasonably short period of
time" will be treated as a single concentration.7 a The E.U. Commission had
proposed to amend Article 3(4) ECMR accordingly such that "transactions
which are conditional on one another or are so closely connected that their
economic rationale justifies their treatment as a single transaction shall be
'
deemed to constitute one and the same concentration." 75
This proposal was
turned down by the Council of Ministers following criticism from several
Member States that the criteria constituting the relevant economic link were
not sufficiently clear. Article 5(2), subparagraph 2, ECMR referring to
staggered transactions also remains unaltered largely for the same reasons.
The E.U. Commission had proposed to confine the applicability of this
provision to transactions concerning related economic sectors.7 6

70 See id. at art. 3(1).

71This is certainly the case for joint ventures constituting concentrations in the sense of
the ECMR, see infra, note 72, but also beyond. See EDURNE NAVARRO VARONA ET AL.,
supra note 6 1, at paras. 2.05 - 2.11 and accompanying notes.
72 However, Recital 23 of Council Regulation 4064/89, EC Merger Regulation, supra
note 1, explained that it is appropriate to define the concept of concentration as to cover
"only operations bringing about a lasting change in the structure of the undertakings
concerned."
Additionally, the creation of joint ventures is only covered if they are
"performing on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity." Id. at
art. 3(2). Further, the exception for credit or other financial institutions and insurance
companies in ECMR Art. 3(5) shows that the concept of control in the ECMR requires such
lasting change.
73See New EC Merger Regulation, supra note 2.
74

id.

75See Commission Proposal on the Control of Concentrations, supra note 12.
76 id.
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IV. PROCEDURAL AMENDMENTS
Perhaps the most important practical amendments of the ECMR are
those of procedural nature. They include the merger timetable, procedural
safeguards, and the E.U. Commission's investigation powers. One can
identify three different areas in the reform of the procedural rules. The first
area can be characterized as "increased flexibility." This encompasses the
more flexible filing date as well as the invention of "stop the clock"
provisions to extend the investigation periods. The second area of reform is
commonly referred to as "the system of 'checks and balances' and 'due
process."' This encompasses measures enhancing transparency, procedural
safeguards, and improved scrutiny and has to be looked at in conjunction
with the CFI's newly invented fast-track procedure. v The third part may be
termed "increased powers of investigation."
A. Increased Flexibility
1.

FilingDate: No TriggeringEvent

In the current version of the ECMR, notifications of concentrations
with a Community dimension (i.e., meeting the ECMR's thresholds) must
be made not more than one week after the conclusion of the agreement, the
announcement of the public bid, or the acquisition of a controlling interest.
Whereas the E.U. Commission has been liberal in applying the deadline
established by Article 4(1) ECMR, 8 it does not accept notifications unless
and until a binding agreement has been made.
During the review process of the Green Paper, several participants in
the discussion voted for a more flexible approach regarding the timetable
The International
for notifications of envisioned concentrations.
Competition Network ("ICN"), for instance, has recommended that parties
to a merger should generally be permitted to notify proposed mergers upon
certification of a good faith intent to consummate the proposed
transaction.79
Obviously, the discussion that followed the publication of the Green
Paper has dispelled doubts regarding doing away with the so-called

77 The expedited procedure was introduced in February 2001 by amending the procedural
rules of the CFI and the ECJ. Under this procedure, a much earlier judgment is made
possible by eliminating the second round of written pleadings, scheduling an early oral
hearing, and having the relevant chamber decide the case as a matter of priority.
78 See

EDURNE NAVARRO VARONA ET AL., supra note 61, at para. 12.37.
79 International Competition Network, Recommended Practices for Merger Notification

(Sept.
2002),
4,
§
Ill(A)
at
Procedures,
www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/practices.pdf.

available

at

http://
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"triggering event." 80 Accordingly, Article 4(1) New ECMR provides that a
concentration with a Community dimension will only need to be notified
before a merger is put into effect and the general principle of ex-ante
merger control would therefore remain valid. It will, however, be entirely
at the obligated party's discretion to decide when to notify a concentration.
First, the one-week deadline for submitting notifications is abandoned.
Second, Article 4(1), subparagraph 2, permits the notification of
concentrations before a binding agreement between the undertakings
involved has been reached. Notification can occur if and when the
undertakings concerned demonstrate to the E.U. Commission a good faith
intention to conclude an agreement or, in the case of a public bid, to
publicly announce an intention to make such a bid, provided that they
would result in a concentration with a Community dimension.
The wording of Article 4(1) raises the question of what exactly the
obliged undertakings have to do to demonstrate a "good faith intention."
Recital 34 of the New ECMR suggests that the parties deliver, for example,
an "agreement in principle, a memorandum of understanding or a letter of
intent signed by all undertakings concerned or, in the case of a public bid,
where they have publicly announced an intention to make such a bid" to
prove their good faith intention to the E.U. Commission. None of these
suggestions provides any further clues as to the actual meaning of
demonstrating a "good faith intention." The term "letter of intent," in
particular, allows for a variety of interpretations which could also include a
mere oral declaration of the notifying parties. Nevertheless, it must be
concluded in particular from the criterion "signed by all undertakings"
introduced by the Council, 81 that a written statement is necessary. A written
agreement would at least provide the E.U. Commission with enough
information to verify the sincerity of the Intended Concentration.
For the parties in merger procedures, the amendment of Article 4(1)
ECMR appears to be advantageous in the majority of cases. Having the
opportunity of early notification may expedite the overall examination and
reduce transaction costs that are generated during contract negotiations,
especially if the merger is at risk of being prohibited. Convergence
between different competition authorities as regards the timing of
notifications might improve the procedural co-ordination with other
jurisdictions (especially with the United States). It is probably for this
reason that the U.S.-E.U. Merger Working Group has stressed, in
connection with their communication of best practices, that cooperation will
80 For details, see Werner Berg & Patrick Ostendorf, The Reform of EC Merger Control:

Substance and Impact of the New ProceduralRules, 24 EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 594, 595

(2003).
81The Commission Proposal did not contain this suggestion, see Commission Proposal
on the Control of Concentrations, supranote 12, at Recital 28.
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be most effective when the
8 2 timetables of the reviewing agencies run more
or less on a parallel track.
Nevertheless, there may be one potential problem which is not of mere
hypothetical nature in increasingly concentrated markets. So far, it has
been the E.U. Commission's practice so far to take into account the fact
that two other competitors on the same market have already merged or are
planning to do so when considering a proposed merger between
competitors. In its assessment of the proposed merger of Price Waterhouse
and Coopers & Lybrand ("PW/C & L") for example, the E.U. Commission
also took into account the intended merger of KPMG and Ernst & Young,
which had been notified to the E.U. Commission on December 23, 1997,
only twelve days after receipt of the notification in the PW/C & L
concentration.8 4 Special attention was given to the post-merger market with
regard to this dual-merger scenario. The E.U. Commission found this
analysis of a "dual-merger scenario" justified,
since under the Merger Regulation the effects of merger operations are
assessed in a perspective which is projected into the future of the
market, taking into account not only the changes brought about by the
merger itself but also making allowance for future development such as
new entrants, liberalisation, product innovation and so on, and since the
KPMG/E & Y agreement was a well-known fact in the market place.
When KPMG and Ernst & Young publicly announced that they had
jointly agreed to terminate their merger plans, 86 the E.U. Commission came
lead to an
to the conclusion that the
87 merger of PW/C & L would not
oligopolistic dominance.
A similar situation arose in the case of Shell/DEA 88 with regard to the
proposed BP/E.ON concentration89 , which was notified on July 27, 2001,
only seventeen days after the E.U. Commission had received the
notification of Shell and DEA. 90 In its press releases on the partial referrals
of both concentrations to the German Federal Cartel Office

82 U.S.-E.U. Merger Working

Group, Best Practices on Co-Operation in Merger

Investigations, at para. 4, available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/
others/eu us.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2004).
83 See Case IV/M.1044, KPMG/Ernst & Young, 1998 O.J. (C5) 3.
84 See Case IV/M.1016, Price Waterhouse/Coopers & Lybrand, 1998 O.J. (L50) 27, at
paras. 1, 108.
85
Id. at para. 108.
86
Id. at para. 110.
87
Id. at para. 119.
88 Case COMP/M.2389, ShelI/DEA, 2001 O.J. (C 202) 18.
89 Case COMP/M.2533, BP/E.ON, 2001 O.J. (C 222) 11.
90 See Shell, 2001 O.J. (C 202) 18.
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("Bundeskartellamt") the E.U. Commission indicated that the "combination
of the respective petrochemicals activities of Shell and DEA, on the one
hand, and of BP and E.ON, on the other hand, raises fears of a creation of a
collective dominant position." 9 1
Even though the E.U. Commission was frilly aware of the "dualmerger" scenario, in neither case 92 did it explicitly indicate which criteria it
would use to solve the problems arising from these scenarios. It did,
however, refer to both the outlook of an assessment under the ECMR and
the KPMG and Ernst & Young agreement as "well-known fact(s) in the
marketplace., 93 Under Article 4(1) New ECMR, any forward-looking
approach of the E.U. Commission will become more difficult because
uncertainties may well increase both in terms of whether a concentration
will be finalised at all and in terms of timing. In the worst case it could
even provoke a situation in which two parties feign a merger in order to
hold off another one. Whereas this seems to be a rather theoretical concern
given that a notification procedure always includes the provision of
sensitive data to the E.U. Commission and-to some extent-to
competitors, Article 4(1) New ECMR may result in a sort of race to be
assessed first, particularly as markets become increasingly concentrated. It
is therefore likely that the E.U. Commission will have to clarify its policy
with regard to "dual-merger" scenarios.94
2.

Decision Deadlines: "Stop the Clock" Provisions

According to the current ECMR, the E.U. Commission starts the initial
examination period immediately after receiving the notification. Within a
period of one month the E.U. Commission must adopt a first decision,
which may be to "initiate proceedings" and therefore to open "Phase Two"

91Press Release, European Commission, Commission refers oil products part of
SheI/DEA deal to Germany, deepens probe into petrochemicals markets, IP/01/1222 (Aug.
24,
2001),
available
at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/
guesten.ksh?paction.gettxt=gt&doc=IP/01/1222101RAPID&lg=EN;
Press
Release,
European Commission, Commission refers oil products part of BP/O.EN deal to Germany,
deepens probe into petrochemicals markets, IP/01/1247 (Sept. 6, 2001).
92 See also Case IV/M012, Varta/Bosch, 1991, O.J. (L 320) 26 (declaring the
compatibility of a concentration with the common market); see also Christoph Stadler,
"Conflicting Mergers": Combined Assessment or Priority Rule?, EUR. COMPETITION L.
REv. 321, 330 at n. 2 (2003).
93 There seem to be two limitations: (1) no decision can be based on facts which have
not been the object of consultation with the parties, see EC Merger Regulation, supra note 1,
at art. 18(1); and (2) the reference to potential competition in Article 2 seems to require that
future developments of the markets concerned be taken into account, id. at art. 2.
94 See John M. Schmidt, Spotting the Elephant in ParallelMergers, EUR. COMPETITION L.
REv. 183, 183-202 (2003) (discussing the different approaches of combined assessment
versus priority rule); see also Stadler, supra note 92, at 321.
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of the merger control procedure.95 This initial examination period will only
be extended if either the undertakings concerned propose amendments to
the concentrations 96 or one or more Member States request that the E.U.
Commission refers a case to their competition authorities.9 7 If the E.U.
Commission has launched "Phase Two" proceedings because it considers
that the concentration raises serious doubts as to its compatibility with the
common market, a second and therefore final decision must be made within
a period of four months.98 If the E.U. Commission fails to make a decision
within this period, the concentration is cleared regardless of any anticompetitive effects it might have. Again, the time frame for "Phase Two"
as laid down in the procedural provisions of the present ECMR cannot be
extended by the E.U. Commission, even if the parties concerned agree with
such a prolongation of the inquiry or offer commitments.
This strict timetable has increasingly been called into question in the
light of increasingly complex concentrations and difficult negotiations
regarding commitments. The New ECMR contains some changes which
will increase flexibility. First of all, the time periods referred to in the
proposal are now expressed in terms of working days in order to simplify
the calculation of deadlines. 99 However, the timetable of "Phase One" has
not been substantially modified, with the exception of a brief prolongation
of the time allowed for a decision by the E.U. Commission. According to
Article 10(1) New ECMR, E.U. Commission decisions finalizing "Phase
One" must be taken within twenty-five working days, instead of one month
according to the regime to date. If the E.U. Commission receives a request

95 EC Merger Regulation, supra note 1, at art. 6(2).

96 The Commission can accept commitments in Phase One as well as in Phase Two. Id.
at arts. 6(2), 8(2). Whereas commitments in Phase One will be accepted "where the
competition problem is readily identifiable and can easily be remedied," commitments in
Phase Two must be "proportional to and would entirely eliminate the competition problem."
See Council Regulation 1310/97, supra note 1, at Recital 8. For further details regarding
commitments within merger procedure, see Simon Holmes & Sarah Tumbull, Remedies in
Merger Cases: Recent Developments, EuR. COMPETITION L. REv. 499 (2002); see also

Wemer Berg, Zusagen in der Europdiischen Fusionskontrolle [Commitments in European
Merger Control], 12 EUROPAISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 362 (2003).

97 EC Merger Regulation, supra note 1, at art. 10(1), para. 2.
98 Id. at art. 10(3).
99 The concept of working days is defined in Article 25 EC Merger Implementing
Regulation and refers exclusively to the E.U. Commission's working days. EC Merger
Implementing Regulation, supra note 59. Commission Proposal on the control of
concentrations, supra note 12, at 10, para. 69. It is, however, doubtful that deadlines
referring exclusively to Member States' authorities (as, for example, in the referral
provisions) are to be calculated on the basis of the E.U. Commission's working days. In any
case the concept of working days will make reference to the holiday calendar which is
published yearly. See, e.g. Holidays in 2004, 2003 O.J. (C 284) 10 (listing of official E.U.
Commission holidays).
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by a Member State to refer the case to the national competition authorities
pursuant to Article 9(2) New ECMR or undertakings concerned offer
commitments with a view to render the concentration compatible with the
common market, the period will automatically be extended to thirty-five
working days.
The amendments regarding the timetable for "Phase Two" are more
important. According to Article 10(3) New ECMR, final decisions must be
made within ninety working days after the initiation of the proceedings by
the E.U. Commission. This period would now be extended to 105 working
days if the undertakings concerned offer commitments, but not if these
commitments were submitted earlier than fifty-five working days after the
initiation of the proceedings. This way, all parties concerned shall be
encouraged to submit commitments at an early stage. 00 Additionally, the
period set for "Phase Two" may be extended by the E.U. Commission at
any time by up to twenty working days with the consent of the notifying
parties. The notifying parties can also ask for such an extension of the
timetable on their own initiative within fifteen working days of the
initiation of the proceedings. The E.U. Commission will have no discretion
to refuse such a request and the extension must therefore be granted.
An extended timetable will permit a more thorough scrutiny of revised
commitments (including market testing). Moreover, additional time will in
all likelihood improve the quality of the investigation of facts and the
economic assessment as well as the outcome of negotiations between the
case team and the notifying parties. Further, more thorough consultation
with the Advisory Committee according to Article 19 of the current and the
New ECMR might also result in deadline extensions, especially in light of
the fact that the Advisory Committee is usually consulted at the end of
"Phase Two" proceedings and consultations are therefore often subject to
time constraints pursuant to Article 10(3) ECMR.
On the other hand, even if the notifying parties do have to approve an
optional prolongation, the pressure to do so might be substantial. For the
responsible case team, the request for more time could easily be justified
with additional examination requirements, such as the verification of
amended commitments. To avoid a prohibition of the merger due to alleged
time squeezes, a notifying party would most probably not risk refusing its
approval for stopping the clock. This, in turn, might lead to a general
uncertainty for the notifying parties regarding the timetable for the
proceedings. Finally, reliance on extension provisions could simply delay
the procedure without necessarily improving its outcome.
All in all, the positive aspects would appear to outweigh the negative

100See Commission Proposal on the Control of Concentrations, supra note 12, at 14,

para. 75.
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ones. First of all, it is up to the parties themselves to determine whether the
first "stop the clock provision" will apply (namely, if they do not deliver
commitments within the first fifty-five working days).
Second, the
disadvantages described in connection with the optional extension of the
"Phase Two" deadline by up to twenty working days with the agreement of
the parties are not too high a price to pay for the main potential advantage,
the improvement of scrutiny and therefore the avoidance of decisions, the
quality of which is compromised by undue time pressure.
B. The System of "Checks and Balances" and "Due Process"
The system of "Checks and Balances" and "Due Process" in EC
merger control proved to be much more efficient than one could have
feared, when the CFI delivered its judgments annulling four E.U.
Commission prohibition decisions in 2002.'
These judgments, however,
left the E.U. Commission with the task to remedy the shortcomings
identified in its assessments by the CFI.
1.

Internal Checks and Balances

In its prohibition decisions, the CFI emphasized, inter alia, serious
shortcomings in the application of economic analysis as well as a lack of
proven evidence. With a series of non-legislative measures that were
introduced by the E.U. Commission in a press release and are, at least
partly, included in the Best Practices on the conduct of EC merger control
proceedings 0 2 which form part of the reform package, the E.U.
Commission is trying to improve its internal system of checks and
balances.10 3 The announced measures can be divided into two categories:
improvements in terms of transparency and due process and attempts to
enhance the process of substantive scrutiny within the proceedings.
a)

Transparency and Due Process

Under the ECMR and in the E.U. Commission's practice to date,
access to the E.U. Commission's case file is granted at a late stage in the
procedure. According to Article 18(3) of the current and the New ECMR
and Article 13(3) of Regulation 447/98 ("Implementing Regulation"),' 0 4 the

101See Airtours, 2002 E.C.R. II 2585; Schneider Electric, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4071; Tetra

Laval, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4381; Lagarddreand Canal+,2002 E.C.R. 11-4825.
102 See Best Practices, supra note 14.
103 See Press Release, European Commission, Commission Adopts Comprehensive
Reform of EU Merger Control, IP/02/1856 (Dec. 11, 2002), available at http://
europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p action.gettxt-gt&doc=IP/02/1856[0IRAPID&Ig =
EN [hereinafter Comprehensive Reform Release].

104 Commission Regulation (EC) No 447/98 of March 1, 1998 on the notifications, time
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notifying parties have upon request a right to access the case file after the
E.U. Commission has issued a statement of objections to the notifying
parties. Further, the notifying parties are given the opportunity to have
access to documents received after the issuing of the statement of objections
up until the consultation of the Advisory Committee.10 5 According to the
Best Practices on the conduct of E.C. merger control proceedings, the
notifying parties to a concentration will be granted access to "key
documents" obtained by the E.U. Commission on the case immediately
after the initiation of proceedings (i.e. "Phase Two" of the merger control
procedure). 0 6 Such documents would comprise, in the view of the E.U.
Commission, "substantiated submissions of third parties running counter to
the notifying parties' own contentions received during Phase I and
thereafter, including key submissions to which specific reference is made in
the Article 6(1)(c) decision and market studies."' 1 7 The E.U. Commission
further explains that its DG Competition "will use its best endeavours to
provide notifying parties in a timely fashion with the opportunity to review
such documents following the initiation of proceedings and thereafter on an
ad hoc basis." This will, however, only be possible provided "genuine
concerns regarding confidentiality, including fears of retaliation108and the
protection of business secrets" of third parties are not undermined.
Additionally, the E.U. Commission will introduce "state-of-play"
meetings between the parties and the E.U. Commission during the
proceedings at "key stages" of the investigation) °9 It further envisages
"triangular" meetings with third parties on a voluntary basis prior to the oral
hearing (which may be held at the end of the proceedings and is not
replaced by the triangular meeting). Triangular meetings may take place in
situations where two or more opposing views have been communicated to
the E.U. Commission as to key market data and characteristics and the
effects of the concentration on competition in the markets concerned." 0
Finally, the E.U. Commission has announced that it is allocating
additional support staff to the hearing officer."' The hearing officer's
limits and hearings provided for in Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 on the control of
concentrations between undertakings, 1998 O.J. (L 61) 1.
105 See Best Practices, supra note 14, at para. 43.

id. at paras. 45-6.
Id. at para. 45.
108Id. at para. 46.
106
107

109 Key stages are identified to be the point in time in Phase One cases where serious
doubts arise within the meaning of Art. 6, within two weeks after a decision to initiate a
Phase Two investigation, immediately before the issuing of a statement of objections,
following the undertakings' reply to the statement of objections, and/or following the oral
hearing and before the Advisory Committee meets. Id.at para. 33.
110Id. at paras. 38-9.
1 See Comprehensive Reform Release, supra note 103.
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powers were already strengthened by the E.U. Commission before the
publication of the Green Paper,' 12 but contrary to what many commentators
on the Green Paper had opined, 13 they are still restricted to reviewing
whether the procedural rights of the parties concerned have been respected.
b) Enhanced Scrutiny
Probably the most significant lesson learned by the E.U. Commission
from the recent judgments of the CFI has been that the substantive scrutiny
of envisaged mergers and the use of economic assessment within the
proceedings have to be enhanced in order to arrive at decisions that are able
to withstand the test of an in-depth juridical review. 1 4 To reach this goal,
the Commission has appointed a chief competition economist' 15 and has
announced its intention to install a peer review panel' 16 consisting of
experienced officials to scrutinize with a fresh pair of eyes all conclusions
arrived at by the case teams in more complex cases. Whereas the role of the
chief economist is more or less clear,' 7 neither the formation nor the
responsibilities of the peer review panel have been outlined in more detail
so far.118
Unsolved issues will persist, however, on account of both the lack of
new tools and what is probably the main problem in current E.U. merger
control: not only does the E.U. Commission remain both investigator and
decision-maker throughout the entire merger control procedure-whereas
other major jurisdictions have established appeal procedures within the
administration process itself 19-but responsibility for the consideration of
cases in "Phase One" and "Phase Two" will also not be divided between

112 See Commission Decision of May 23 on the terms of reference of hearing officers in
certain competition proceedings, 2001 O.J. (L 162) 21.
113 See Summary of the Replies Received, supra note 26, at para. 197.
114 For the impact of these decisions on the reform of the ECMR, see Alessandro Nucara,

Schneider/Legrand and Tetra Laval/Sidel: Fast Track Towards Merger Reform?, 14 EUR.
Bus. L. REV. 193, 198 (2003).
115 See supra note 17.
116 Comprehensive Reform Release, supra note 103.
117 See supra note 17; Notice, E.U. Directorate-General for Competition, Publication of
A2 Post of Chief Competition Economist, at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/
competition/recruitment/chiefeconomist-en.pdf.
118 According to Commissioner Monti, the panel will be composed of "experienced
officers" as well as, if appropriate, officials from other relevant services. See Mario Monti,
supra note 9. See also Stephen A. Ryan, Reform of the EU Merger Control System-a
comprehensivepackage ofproposals, 1 EC COMPETITION POL'Y NEWSL. 9, 12 (Spring 2003).
119 See, e.g., U.K. Office
of Fair Trading, Overview of the Enterprise Act, at
http://www.oft.gov.uk/nr/rdonlyres/1923f9db-0e78-4e91-92a3-182b6400e46a/0/oft518.pdf
(describing the new system of merger control in the U.K., where decision-making in the two
phases are performed by two different, independent bodies).
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different task forces or between the E.U. Commission and an independent
body. This division has been suggested by different contributors to the
debate following the publication of the Green Paper in 2001 as a way of
20
avoiding any kind of prejudice on the part of E.U. Commission officials.1
They argue that, in particular, in installing the review panel the Commission
does not distinguish between investigation and adjudication 21 and therefore
fails to establish an institutionalized division of powers within the Merger
Task Force.
There can be no question that all the proposed measures are helpful
and will in all likelihood increase transparency of and improve the scrutiny
in the examination process. Nevertheless, with few exceptions (i.e., the
appointment of a chief competition economist and the peer review panel),
all the measures proposed merely seek to improve already existing tools in
the current system of checks and balances.
2.

ProcedureFollowingAnnulments: Re-examination by the E. U.
Commission (Article 10(5) New ECMR)

Following the prohibition decisions of the CFI, uncertainties arose as
to the procedure and the substantive rules to be applied in the merger
control procedure.
Article 10(5) New ECMR clarifies that after the
annulment decision the procedure will start at the beginning of the first
phase. Such an annulment will thus lead to the re-examination by the E.U.
Commission with a view to adopting a new decision pursuant to Article
6(1) New ECMR. The new examination will be made in the light of current
market conditions. The parties will have to submit a new notification or
supplement the original notification, where the original notification has
become incomplete by reason of intervening changes in market conditions
or in the information provided. Where there are no such changes, a
certification of this fact will suffice. The periods of the proceedings would
commence on the working day after the E.U. Commission has received
either a new (complete) notification or a certification in the manner
described above.

120 See

Summary of the Replies Received, supra note 26, at para. 199.
Governance in European Merger

121Herwig H.C. Hofmann, Good

Control: Due
Process and Checks and Balances under Review, 24 EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 114, 127
(2003); Filip Ragolle, Schneider Electric v Commission: The CFI's Response to the Green
Paper on Merger Review, 24 EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 176, 180 (stating that it "will be
difficult to convince the business community that the panel is truly independent from the
Commission" and suggests the upgrading of the Advisory Committee's role in order to
"provide a more credible external review").

706

The New EC Merger Regulation

24:683 (2004)
C. Increased Powers of Investigation
1. Power to take Statements
To date, Article 11(1) ECMR empowers the Commission to obtain all
necessary information from governments and competent authorities of the
Member States, as well as undertakings and individual persons or entities.
However, such information can only be obtained from individuals who
122
control at least one undertaking or acquire one or more undertakings.
The New ECMR will provide increased powers for the Commission.
Article 11(7) will allow the E.U. Commission to interview any natural
person or legal entity who consents to be interviewed for the purpose of
collecting information relating to the subject matter of the investigation.
The E.U. Commission will also have the right to record oral submissions
and use them as evidence in merger proceedings. 123 This new provision fits
in with the strategy of the Merger Task Force to increasingly gather
information from third parties by way of requests for information and is in
accordance with the Best Practices on EC merger24 control, in which the E.U.
Commission even envisages trilateral meetings.'
2.

"On the Spot" Investigations ("Dawn Raids")

According to Article 13(2) ECMR, the E.U. Commission also has,
inter alia, the right to enter an undertaking's premises, land and means of
transport, examine books and other business documents, as well as seize
and copy documents and ask for so-called "on the spot" oral explanations.
However, only the representatives and members of the staff of undertakings
can be asked questions "on the spot." Additionally, under the present legal
situation, it is still controversial whether the E.U. Commission is entitled to
ask more general questions relating 25
to the subject matter as well as require
copies of electronically stored data. 1
The New ECMR seeks to align the E.U. Commission's fact-finding
powers regarding "on the spot" investigations, including its provisions on
fines, with those in the new Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 implementing

See EC Merger Regulation, supra note 1, at arts. 3(1), 11(1).
See New EC Merger Regulation, supra note 2, at Recital 38.
124 See Best Practices, supra note 14, at paras. 38-39.
125 See C.S. KERSE, E.C. ANTITRUST PROCEDURE 120 (3d. ed. 1994)(regarding it as
"extremely doubtful whether an undertaking is entitled to resist the retrieval and inspection
of information contained in sophisticated storage systems"); Von Martin Wissmann,
Rechtsschutz von Unternehmen bei Beschlagnahme von Unterlagen im Rahmen von EGNachpriifungsverfahren, 13 EUROPAISCHES WIRTSCHAFTS-UND STEUERRECHT 165, 166
(2002).
122
123
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Articles 81 and 82 EC. 26 To this end, Article 13(2) of the New ECMR
grants the E.U. Commission the right to seal any business premises, books
or records during an inspection, to take or obtain copies of books or records
in any form and to ask any representative or members of staff of the
undertaking for explanations of facts or documents relating to the subject
matter and purpose of the inspection. Also in line with the new antitrust
rules, the amount of fines which can potentially be imposed by the E.U.
Commission has been increased. According to Article 14(1) New ECMR,
providing incorrect, misleading or incomplete information, as well as
breaking seals affixed by E.U. Commission officials, could lead to a fine of
up to 1%of the aggregate annual turnover for the undertaking concerned.
Aligning the enforcement provisions of merger control with antitrust
rules also means that the same problems will occur as far as the
interpretation and application of several provisions are concerned. For one
thing the legislator has failed in both the New ECMR and Regulation (EC)
1/2003 to clarify whether and to what extent documents or responsive
information may be withheld from the E.U. Commission. The E.U.
Commission will obviously not be empowered, even under the new
regulations, to examine correspondence between undertakings and their
external lawyers. 127 Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether individuals
will have the right to refuse to provide oral statements in a case of potential
self-incrimination. This is likely to be an ongoing issue in antitrust cases,
although the problem of self-incrimination will presumably only occur
infrequently, if at all, in merger proceedings.
Nevertheless, one distinction has been drawn between merger and
antitrust investigations: whereas the new Regulation (EC) 1/2003 for the
enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 grants the E.U. Commission the power to
search the private homes of representatives of the undertakings
concerned, 128 no such right is provided by the new ECMR. Beyond that,
however, the question is whether the alignment of rules for merger and nonmerger investigations is justified with regard to the other fact-finding
powers. This is particularly doubtful in light of the limited importance of
investigations for merger control proceedings within the last thirteen years.
Since the introduction of the ECMR in 1989, Article 13 of the current
Merger Regulation has been used very rarely by the Commission, 29 and the
126See

Council Regulation 1/2003, supra note 6.

127 Case T-30/89, Hilti Aktiengesellschaft v. Commission, 1990 E.C.R. 11-163, at para.

13; Case 155/79, A.M. & S. Europe Ltd. v. Commission, 1982 E.C.R. 1575, at paras. 21-27.
128See Council Regulation 1/2003, supra note 6, at art. 21.
129Nicole

Hacker,

Article 13

FKVO,

in

KOMMENTAR

ZUM

EUROPAISCHEN

WETTBEWERBSRECHT [COMMENTARY ON EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW], at para. 2 (Helmuth

Schr6ter et al. eds., 2003). See C.J. COOK & C.S. KERSE, E.C. MERGER CONTROL 115 (3d. ed.

2000).
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E.U. Commission has failed to indicate why "on the spot" investigations are
likely to become more important in the future.
D. Miscellaneous
1. Ancillary Restraints

Article 6(1)(b), second subparagraph of the current and the New
ECMR, Article 8(2), second subparagraph, second sentence ECMR and
Article 8(2), third subparagraph New ECMR provide that a decision
declaring a concentration compatible with the Common Market shall also
cover restrictions which are directly related and necessary to the
implementation of the concentrations.13 According to Article 22(1) ECMR
and Article21(1) New ECMR, that Regulation alone applies to
concentrations covered by the (New) ECMR. Since all such restrictions are
already covered by the provisions mentioned above and any such
assessment was only of a declaratory nature, the E.U. Commission
abandoned its practice of assessing whether ancillary restrictions were
"directly related and necessary" to the implementation of a notified
merger. 31 When this policy was thrown into doubt by the CFI,' 32 the E.U.
Commission needed to implement it in legislation. Under the New ECMR,
the E.U. Commission will indeed not generally have to assess such
restrictions in individual cases. It will, however, at the request of the
parties, expressly assess whether or not any restriction is directly related to,
and necessary for, the implementation of the concentration, in cases
presenting novel or unresolved questions giving rise to genuine uncertainty.
According to the last sentence of Recital 21 of the New ECMR "a case
presents a novel or unresolved question giving rise to genuine uncertainty if
the question is not covered by the relevant Commission notice in force or a
published Commission decision." 133
Parties to a concentration will welcome this addendum because they
may bring to the E.U. Commission's attention any restrictions, for which
they would like to obtain clearance and, thereby, legal certainty. If they can
convince the E.U. Commission that the restriction at issue "presents a novel
or unresolved question giving rise to genuine uncertainty" the E.U.
Commission will have to give its opinion. The restriction, if regarded as

130 This

concept is also referred to in Recital 25 ECMR. See EC Merger Regulation,
supra note 1, at Recital 25, Recital 21 New ECMR; see New EC Merger Regulation, supra
note 2, at Recital 21.
131See Commission Notice on Restrictions Directly Related and Necessary to
Concentrations, 2001 O.J. (C 188) 5.
132 See Lagardreand Canal+, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4825, at paras. 2-3.
133New EC Merger Regulation, supra note 2.
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directly related and necessary to the merger, could subsequently not be
challenged before national competition authorities. Given the importance
of the individual circumstances for the assessment of ancillary restraints,
parties to concentrations may hope to convince the E.U.
34 Commission of
such uncertainties not only in exceptional circumstances. 1
2.

Suspension of Concentrations: Amending the Scope of Exemptions
(Article 7(2) New ECAMR)

Article 7(2) New ECMR has been extended so as to grant automatic
derogation from the stand-still obligation in Article 7(1) New ECMR
beyond public bids, to all acquisitions made from various sellers through
the stock market, e.g. the so-called "creeping takeovers.' ' 135 This provision
brings legal certainty for the acquirers in creeping
takeovers and may
36
facilitate hostile takeovers in the European Union.'
3.

Clarificationof the Power of Separation (Article 8(4) New ECMR)

The new wording of Article 8(4) clarifies that the scope of application
does not exclude mergers implemented without prior notification to the
E.U. Commission. It further empowers the E.U. Commission to order that a
prohibited concentration be dissolved completely so as to restore the
situation prevailing
prior to the implementation of the concentration (status
37
quo ante).1

134

In this regard, parties to concentrations may point at the CFI's statement in Lagardire

and Canal+which reads:
[i]n
this connection, it must be observed that, as the Commission itself pointed out in the
notice on ancillary restrictions (see paragraph 1-6), the question whether a restriction is

'directly related and necessary to the implementation of the concentration' cannot be
answered in general terms. Whether a restriction is directly related and necessary in any
particular case therefore requires complex economic assessments for which the competent
authority has a broad discretion (see, to that effect, the judgment in Remia and Others, cited
in paragraph 85 above, and the M6 judgment, paragraph 114)."
Lagardreand Canal+, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4825, at para. 98.
135 See Commission Proposal on the control of concentrations, supra note 12, at para. 66;

see also Green Paper on the review of Council Regulation 4064/89 of 11 December 2001,
supra note 3, at paras. 187-89.
136 See Green Paper on the review of Council Regulation 4064/89 of 11 December 2001,

supra note 3, at para. 134.

137 See Commission Proposal on the control of concentrations, supra note 12, at para. 92

(where the Commission referred to the judgment of the CFI in its recent Case T-5/02, TetraLaval v. Commission, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4381, at para. 36).
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4. Interim Measures (Article 8(5) New ECMR)
Article 8(5) New ECMR empowers the E.U. Commission to adopt
interim measures to restore or maintain conditions of effective competit'on
where a concentration has been implemented in contravention of Article 7
or of a condition attached to a Commission decision under Articles 6(l)(b)
or 8(2) New ECMR, or has already been implemented and is declared
incompatible with the common market. This provision will enable the E.U.
Commission to order any appropriate measure to ensure that conditions of
effective competition are not distorted in the interim, i.e., before a final
decision is rendered or for the transitional period until the status quo ante is
restored. Such measures could include, inter alia, a requirement to hold
separate the undertakings or assets brought together until they are legally
separated, 38
the cessation of the exercise of joint control or similar interim
measures. 1
5. No Block Exemptions and no FilingFees
Finally, it is worth noting that an initiative of the E.U. Commissior to
introduce a block exemption regulation for de minimis concentrations to be
exempted from the ECMR 139 was blocked by the Council. The same holds
true for the E.U. Commission's proposal that it should be given the power
to levy filing fees. 140 Member States were unwilling to grant these
additional powers to the E.U. Commission, which is in line with most
comments provided to the E.U. Commission in response to the publication
of its Green Paper on the review of Council Regulation 4064/89.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

The adoption of the New ECMR in January 2004 was a significant
step in the development of the E.C. merger control which will be finalized
with the adoption of the EC Merger Implementing Regulation before May
1, 2004. The allocation of jurisdiction, which will be under constant
monitoring, will trigger the next regular reform procedure when the E.U.
Commission presents its reports on the functioning of the thresholds in
Article 1 New ECMR and the referral procedures in Article 4(4) and (5)
New ECMR as laid down in Articles 1(4) and 4(6) New ECMR by July 1,
2009.
138See Commission Proposal on the control of concentrations, supra note 12, at para. 93.

1' See id. at art. 7(4); see also Green Paper on the review of Council Regulation 4064/89
of 11 December 2001, supra note 3, at paras. 177-79.
140See Commission Proposal on the control of concentrations, supra note 12, at art.
23(1)(e); see also Green Paper on the review of Council Regulation 4064/89 of 11 December
2001, supra note 3, at paras. 227-3 1.
141 See Summary of the Replies Received, supra note 26, at paras. 185-87.
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More than two years of consultation and negotiation of the second
regular review procedure saw interesting and unexpected developments,
which culminated in the adoption of a new substantive test for merger
control in the European Union. It is possible that without the Airtours
case1 42 (and perhaps even without the divergent decisions of the E.U.
Commission and the FTC in the GE/Honeywell concentration) the
substantive test in Article 2 New ECMR would have remained unchanged.
With the new test, the door may be open for further developments in the
direction of a fully fledged substantial lessening competition test. One
practical impact to date is that concentrations leading to non-collusive
oligopolies which trigger price increases, but do not lead to market
dominance, may be prohibited under the New ECMR.
Interestingly, the triggering event for the second reform, the revision
of the turnover thresholds and thus the allocation ofjurisdiction between the
European Union and the Member States fell behind the discussion on the
substantive test in the public opinion, after the suggested three-plus
system-being the key issue in the E.U. Commission's Green Paper-had
triggered harsh criticism from the legal community. 143 The jurisdictional
amendments remaining in the New ECMR are a facilitated 44 and more
sophisticated 145 post-notification referral system and a pre-notification the
significance of which will have to be proved in practice. Let us hope that
the increased flexibility in terms of forum (in both directions) will indeed
lead to a reduction of multi-jurisdictional filings.
On balance, the procedural amendments of the E.U. merger system
seem to be the most important ones. Undoubtedly, the New ECMR will
provide more flexibility without doing away with the guarantee of tight and
pre-determinable deadlines, and thus the desirable legal certainty for the
parties concerned. In particular, the elimination of deadlines and the
necessity of a "triggering event" regarding the notification procedure, as
well as the introduction of "stop the clock" provisions with the consent of
the notifying parties within the proceedings should meet with approval.
Although, the European Union has passed up an opportunity to launch a
reform implementing an entirely new and more effective system of checks
and balances instead of just improving on existing tools or unnecessarily
increasing the E.U. Commission's powers of investigation, the procedural

142Airtours, 2002 E.C.R. 11-2585, at para. 62.

143 See Summary of the Replies Received, supra note 26, at para. 9; see also Werner Berg
& Andreas Digel, supra note 28. The three-minus system, despite its importance, did not
trigger a lot of publicity.
144 See Council Regulation, supra note 2. This is particularly true for referrals from the
E.U. Commission under Article 9(2)(a).
145 See New EC Merger Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 22. This is particularly true for
referrals to the E.U. Commission under Article 22.
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amendments are such that parties to future concentrations may hope to
benefit from these measures.
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